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# Speaking from the shadows: Memory and mass violence in Bali

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No, we have not forgotten, and we have not let our children forget. Forgetting has not been our problem. The problem is how to live together with what we still remember.

– Balinese survivor of the anti-communist massacres of 1965/66

Any attempt at facilitating reconciliation in the wake of mass crimes must address the place of memory.<sup>1</sup> For it is memory that links past violence, betrayal and community fragmentation to the ongoing politics of the present, shaping the limits and possibilities of re-imagining social life. The relationship of memory to peace-building may, however, be far more complex than is often considered by policymakers and practitioners. Memory may offer a language of hope, a grounding for assertions of “never again”, but memory may also provide the spark for continuing conflict. Memory can foster a sense of shared experience and community solidarity, and memory can feed feelings of persecution and revenge. Memory can provide the material through which social mechanisms – from ritual to myth to informal narrative to formal truth and reconciliation commissions – work to reconsider history and open discussion of the traumatic experiences of individuals and communities. And memory can be suppressed, channelled and transmuted into new forms of subjectivity that may both reproduce and recode relations of inequality, violence and terror.

Since 1999, we have been engaged in a collaborative ethnographic fieldwork project with survivors of Indonesia’s 1965/66 state-sponsored

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anti-communist violence. Between October 1965 and March 1966, approximately one million Indonesians were killed as alleged communists, some 70,000 others were imprisoned without trial, untold numbers of women were sexually assaulted and hundreds of thousands of family members of those killed or imprisoned were stamped with the label of “unclean environment” (*tidak bersih lingkungan*) and deprived of basic civil rights until the fall of President Suharto’s 32-year military-backed dictatorship in 1998.<sup>2</sup> The island of Bali is known to have experienced some of the most intense violence, with some 80,000 to 100,000 suspected leftists (approximately 5 to 8 per cent of the island’s population) killed by military and paramilitary forces.<sup>3</sup> For the past four decades – and especially under Suharto’s “New Order” government – Balinese have struggled with a legacy of oppression and violence and with ambivalence about articulating memories of terror in a social, political and economic milieu in which state power, tourism capital and the embeddedness of violence in intimate social relations have constrained discursive possibilities. Despite a change in regime, and with it calls for a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi Nasional) to be formed in Indonesia,<sup>4</sup> these issues have not lost their poignancy for most Balinese survivors of the violence of 1965/66, whose subjectivities and social pathways have been shaped by the ongoing engagement of past and present at the same time as their voices have been marginalized from mainstream discussions of “transitional justice” or “post-conflict peace-building”.

Our aim in this chapter is to provide insight into how Balinese have lived together in the aftermath of mass violence, analysing the place of memory in both continuing community tensions and attempts at national reconciliation. Focusing most closely on the experiences of residents of the village of Kesiman on the outskirts of Bali’s capital city of Denpasar, whom we have engaged in discussion about their memories of 1965/66 and their negotiations of social life in the aftermath of this period during four years of anthropological fieldwork, we pay special attention to how memories of violence tend to be neither mimetic nor fixed, examining how the public narration of past atrocities has been blocked and channelled in particular directions.<sup>5</sup> We argue that memory in this context is an inherently political act, but one that escapes easy conscription by conceptual oppositions such as oppression versus resistance, silence versus speech, history versus memory, conflict versus reconciliation or a distant past and its “working through” or “letting go”. Through this close focus on processes of recalling and distancing violence, a number of key questions emerge: How is past violence located in contemporary social practice? How are memories expressed or hidden in a social field dense with traces of betrayal and the fragmentation of intimate relations? And how

might processes of rebuilding self and society take place outside of or in critical dialogue with formal peace-building mechanisms?

Like the other chapters in this volume, ours is a work of committed scholarship, grounded in an engagement with local struggles and dedicated to a transformation of the terms through which social justice might be conceived and promoted. In highlighting the specificity of relations among violence, memory and social suffering in Bali, our aim is not to undermine efforts to promote healing and reconciliation through a sweeping deconstructive emphasis on the exceptional complexities of local contexts. Rather, our goal is to put ethnography to practice in diagnosing what the anthropologist and physician Paul Farmer has called “pathologies of power”,<sup>6</sup> those relations of injustice and inequality that become situated in bodies, minds and social lives, using these insights to reflect critically and comparatively on contemporary international discourses of “reconciliation”, “peace-building” and “transitional justice”. Sharing a concern with understanding local concepts and practices of reconciliation, we detail the particularities of the Bali case, but concur with Kimberly Theidon in this volume that reflexive nods to “cultural sensitivity” risk reducing situated experiences of violence to generic platitudes or mere variations on a universalized theme. We argue, together with the editors in the Introduction, that without a fundamental rethinking of the post-conflict intervention packages that tend overwhelmingly to fail to recognize the complex transformations that terror engenders in the aftermath of mass crime, projects to promote social recovery are far more likely to be not merely unhelpful but actively dangerous. It is, we believe, only through serious engagement with the uneven textures of memory and the social fabric in which it figures, and with a commitment to unravelling our assumptions about the patterns peace-building should take in light of such local realities, that positive change has the hope of being achieved. We conclude our chapter with some suggestions for those involved in peace-building efforts, in the hope of helping to close the gaps that currently exist between conflict analysis and the experiences of conflict, between transitional justice programs and the hopes and fears of those who still face injustice, and between discourses of reconciliation and the everyday struggles of those who live together in the midst of continuing suffering and suspicion that all too often passes for “peace”.

## History, memory and power

*“Sane pejah tan kecacah antuk babad”* (“The stories of the defeated go unnoted by history”)

– Balinese saying

With the end of 32 years of dictatorship in 1998, many Indonesians began to publicly reconsider the official state history of 1965/66, which framed the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its alleged sympathizers as a necessary defence against threats to national order, development, modernity, democracy and civilization. Taking advantage of new civil freedoms in the post-Suharto era, Indonesian human rights workers, some of them supported by international initiatives for transitional justice or truth and reconciliation, began to gather data on the military's involvement in the killings and on the systematic persecution during Suharto's reign of those alleged to have communist ties.<sup>7</sup> A number of Indonesian historians, often acting in concert with victims' advocacy groups, began to reinterpret historical records to challenge the state's official account of what happened on 30 September 1965, when six Army generals and a lieutenant were killed and their bodies thrown down a well called the Crocodile Hole (Lubang Buaya) in Jakarta, sparking accusations of a communist-backed attempted coup against Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, and giving the "smiling general" Suharto a justification for leading a campaign to destroy Indonesian communism "down to its roots" (*sampai ke akar-akarnya*). In 2000, local non-governmental organizations pressed Indonesia's Parliament to authorize a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (although to date such a body has yet to begin its work). And in cities, towns and villages across the archipelago, those who lived through violence began to speak – sometimes openly, sometimes haltingly, sometimes shuttling nervously between enthusiasm and dread – about their memories of terror, fear and survival.

Such public acts of re-remembering 1965/66 have, however, been met by ambivalent responses, making it painfully clear that a change of regime has not produced simple corresponding shifts at the levels of community, culture and subjectivity. Attempts in 2001 to exhume a mass grave of massacre victims in Wonosobo, Java, sparked a violent anti-communist backlash by extremist Muslim groups, and victims' rights activists have found themselves threatened and harassed by those claiming to be guarding the nation against a revival of communism.<sup>8</sup> Even Abdurrahman Wahid, president of Indonesia from October 1999 to July 2001, who issued a public apology in March 2000 for the role that members of his Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic organization played in carrying out the violence,<sup>9</sup> could not succeed in persuading the Indonesian legislature to repeal the 1966 law (TAP XXV/MPRS/1966) banning both the Indonesian Communist Party and "Marxist-Leninist Ideology", leaving many survivors uncertain about the very legality of speaking about their experiences of suffering.

It is not, however, only an anti-communist right wing in Indonesia that has questioned activist calls to "bring the past to light" in the service of

national reconciliation. In our discussions with Balinese survivors of the violence, one of the most important insights they shared with us is that 1965/66 is not simply an event of the past against which one can take a distanced stance. It is not something that one intentionally chooses to either “remember” by way of a truth commission or a revamped national curriculum that aims to replace falsehoods with facts, or to “forget” by way of erasure from the mass media or official histories or through more personal attempts to deny or disregard. It is not, as some Western psychological models might encourage us to think, a traumatic experience located safely in individual or social history, recovery from which involves a “working through” or “letting go” of a destructive past, or the arrival at “closure” through an imposition of meaningful narrative on the chaos of pathologically insistent and fragmentary memory.<sup>10</sup> Rather, the events of 1965/66 have channelled and dammed possibilities for speech, social action and religious and cultural meaning, giving rise to new relations between language, experience, social space and political practice. Violence – real, remembered and potential – continues to reverberate through social networks, marking everyday life and moulding aspirations for the future. For Balinese survivors, “reconciliation” implies not simply a “coming together” of opposing sides of a conflict, but a far more weighted re-imagining of discourses of self, society, community and citizenship.

In part, the endurance of the events of 1965/66 and their continuing poignancy in the present have been effects of the New Order state’s persistent attempts to control understandings of what it termed the *Peristiwa ’65* or “1965 Incident”, to contain a diverse range of terrifying experiences within temporal bounds (“The Incident”) while at the same time expanding them into a flexible master symbol (“Communism”) that authorized ongoing political oppression. The New Order state’s strategies for discursive management included both the repressive imposition of silence upon survivors, and an enthusiastic program of commemoration and symbolic control of the history of the violence. The Suharto regime’s official account of 1965/66 was deployed to advertise its claims to rule and to justify its harsh social and political policies as a paternalistic protection against an ever-present threat of communist disorder. Under Suharto, public debate of the events was banned, and alternative analyses of both the alleged coup and the violence that followed were censored. Borrowing from modern biomedical imagery, those accused of being “infected” by the dangerous virus of communism – those who had once been known as neighbours, relatives and friends – were stigmatized and socially alienated, painted in official portrayals as shadowy, sadistic figures laying in wait for a chance to contaminate the beloved nation, which needed to be protected by a vigilant military and a powerful system of state surveil-

lance. (Theidon, in chapter 4, discusses the use of similar rhetoric by the Peruvian military.) For a new generation of Indonesians, the halting tales their parents might have told of their experiences – or the deep silences they may have effected to preserve their safety – were drowned out by the insistent rhetoric of the New Order, which staged regular “remembrances” of the alleged 30 September coup and the state’s victory over communism, and which spread images of communist evil and bloodthirstiness through the school curriculum, public monuments such as the Crocodile Hole and the Museum Pengkhianatan PKI (Museum of the PKI Treachery) in Jakarta and propaganda pieces such as the state-produced film *Pengkhianat G/30/S (The 30 September Movement Traitors)*, which was screened on public television and in classrooms each 30 September until 1999. One Balinese university student whose grandfather had been killed in the violence, which took place 15 years before his birth, described to us how his understanding of his family history had been shaped by such state rhetoric: “Starting in elementary school I learned that communists were evil and violent, and I was confused about how my own family could have been among them. But when I asked my mother how Grandfather could have been such a bad person, she said nothing. Only later did I realize that her silence was meant to protect me.”

The maintenance of these official narratives of communist evil and threat continued throughout Suharto’s reign, despite the global thaw in Cold War rhetoric that marked the 1990s. Up until Suharto’s fall – and even after – state officials regularly animated the spectre of communism as an instrument of social control, dismissing almost any sort of social or political protest as the work of “formless organizations” (*organisasi tanpa bentuk*) of communist sympathizers or as the result of provocation by “remnants” of the PKI. Warnings to remain on guard against communism were typically expressed in the command *awas bahaya laten PKI/komunisme* (“beware of the latent danger of the PKI/communism”), rendering “communism” less a matter of party affiliation or intellectual position than an invisible but inevitable aspect of virtually any challenge to Suharto or his military regime.<sup>11</sup> Labour protests, attempts at unionization or the formation of political parties, or the use of discourses of “human rights” to counter state control of civil society – all were linked in state rhetoric to the lurking threat of communism.

The importance placed on capitalist development by Suharto’s state also shaped the context in which memories of violence could be articulated. Beginning in the 1970s, the New Order, with the assistance of the World Bank, embarked on an ambitious project to build on colonial-era stereotypes of Bali as an exotic, enchanted island paradise, as well as classic anthropological representations of Balinese values of social harmony and consensus, to make the island the nation’s premiere “cultural

tourism” destination. By the mid-1990s, over 1,000,000 foreign tourists were visiting Bali each year. This tourism industry – upon which some 80 per cent of Balinese depend, directly or indirectly, for their livelihoods – has simplified and commodified representations of a harmonious Bali, turning them into spectacular commercial displays used to advertise the island as an outpost of peaceful, pre-modern culture where life revolves around ancient, apolitical religious ritual and social relations are based on the avoidance of conflict.<sup>12</sup> Not only Bali but the Balinese themselves have been subjects of a representational regime that defines appropriate touristic subjectivity through government campaigns such as *Sapta Persona*, “The Seven Seductions”, which exhorted Balinese to be clean (*bersih*), friendly (*ramah*), orderly (*tertib*), beautiful (*indah*), safe (*aman*), preservationist (*lestari*) and memorable (*kenangan*) in order to maintain their ability to attract tourists. Tourism attempted to cover up violence with layers of such symbolism, at the same time as it often literally covered up traumatic history, as in the case of one five-star beachfront resort in Seminyak, South Bali whose lushly landscaped grounds are known by the local community (but not, of course, by the vast majority of its guests) to cover a mass grave containing bodies of victims of 1965/66.<sup>13</sup>

It is important to recognize, however, that tourism is not merely a discourse produced by Balinese for consumption by an outside audience. Tourism in Bali acts not only as an image-producing industry but, to borrow a concept from Jacques Lacan, as an imaginary, a symbolic order that initiates humans into subjectivity, language and social law. Government agencies charged with promoting tourism as the key to developing Bali have recognized the power of tourism to not only attract foreign exchange but to work as a call to self-control for Balinese, who are exhorted neither to challenge the status quo nor to call public attention to past or present violence within families or communities because a fickle tourist audience might be watching. The combined effects of such discourses have had serious effects on survivors of 1965/66 and their ability or desire to speak about their experiences, especially in public. Under Suharto, articulating memories that contradicted official narratives was a dangerous act that risked harsh response from the state. But even in the post-Suharto period, when a new openness finally seemed possible, survivors with an economic interest in maintaining tourism-industry images of a non-violent Bali have often been deeply ambivalent about voicing traumatic memories, recognizing that this is generally not the kind of “culture” tourists wish to consume. Indeed, one of the many bitter ironies of 1965/66 is that many survivors of the violence who were marked as being linked to communism and thus were barred from most employment were forced into the informal economic sector. Many survivors who began by selling trinkets to tourists on the beach in the early 1970s when mass

tourism was first developing have ended up becoming successful participants in the industry, giving them a serious economic incentive to censor their own memories. Speaking about 1965/66 in ways that counter official history has, in other words, been understood as not only politically dangerous but economically irrational.

Recognizing the powerful role of the state in managing Balinese relations with the past has important implications for understanding Balinese ambivalence about projects that call upon survivors of mass crimes to support reconciliation in the name of national unity. In post-Suharto Indonesia, democratic subjects, reconciled among themselves, with their histories, and with the responsibilities of citizenship, have been identified as the necessary building blocks for constructing a new nation. Yet translating “reconciliation” into practices of reshaping power and personhood has been a complex and contested endeavour. There are no terms in the Balinese language that correspond to the key notions of “forgiveness”, “amnesty” and “witnessing” embedded in many models of truth-telling and reconciliation. This is an important matter, for it highlights not only the cultural implications of disseminating concepts of reconciliation, but the ways in which many Balinese have perceived the Indonesianized term *rekonsiliasi* as part of a language emanating from the Indonesian state, and beyond it, the West. Speaking of *rekonsiliasi*, then, is to insert oneself in a discursive space occupied by an array of powerful linked terms, including *reformasi* (political reform), *partisipasi* (participation) and *demokrasi* (democracy). To engage with *rekonsiliasi* as it has been articulated by political elites within the context of national unity has been to position oneself within particular framings of citizenship about which Balinese victims of state violence and the curtailment of civil rights have frequently been highly suspicious. Many Balinese also recognize that despite the resignation of Suharto, numerous structures and relations of power and inequality remain intact, including the national history textbooks, which still fail to even acknowledge that the mass killings ever occurred. Reconciliation in this context becomes a matter not just of dealing with a past, but also of facing its continuing traces in the present.

### The intimacy of terror

If we recognize that peace-building in the aftermath of state-sponsored violence entails far more complex transformations than replacing official histories with local memories, what, then, of the place of memory in reconciliation at the community level? As important a role as the state played in directing discourses of communist threat and anti-communist violence, the continuing power of 1965/66 to shape Balinese social life

and subjectivity has also been an artefact of the context in which the killings and their aftermath were embedded in Bali. To recognize this is not to fall into the worn rut of attributing the intensity of the 1965/66 violence in Bali to an exotic “Balinese culture” or to a fundamentally irrational Balinese temperament inclined to periodic outbursts of wild psychosis or *amuk*<sup>14</sup> – the double that constantly haunts the image of a peaceful, harmonious Bali that has been promoted by the state and the tourism industry. It is rather to recognize the extent to which violence entangled itself in local communities and kin groups, as neighbours killed neighbours and relatives killed relatives, and the very assumptions and expectations brought to bear on social life shifted. It is in the spaces created by these events and their continual unfolding in and into the present – spaces in which state scripts are reproduced even as they are rewritten – that memory arises in complex engagement with official history.

During the violence, there were few Balinese social groupings, whether familial, religious or community-based, that were not fractured by deaths, disappearances and arrests or the threat of such occurrences. Although there were serious tensions in pre-1965 Bali between the organized political left and the organized political right, much of the bloodshed on the island followed lines of social conflict that were local, diverse and shifting, conflicts that cross-cut and shaped formal political allegiances even as they were manipulated by the state to give particular forms to the violence. (See Theidon in this volume, and Scott Straus, also in this volume, for discussion of similar community violence in Peru and Rwanda respectively.) These conflicts erupted over issues of caste, over access to and ownership of land, over economic inequalities, and over status and inheritance within extended families. The violence also worked to exploit and intensify existing inequalities between classes and between genders, underscoring the marginality of women and the poor.

Unlike in many other areas of Indonesia, where the violence of 1965/66 can be described as an intensification of long-standing tensions between communist and nationalist party members or between communists and orthodox Muslims, these conflicts that presaged the violence of 1965/66 in Bali did not always map clearly onto party divisions or result in the same outcomes. For instance, by the 1960s, caste was openly acknowledged in many areas of the island as a major site of social tension, and in Kesiman several local *banjar* (sub-village hamlet associations that organize local politics and ritual) formally split in the late 1950s into separate high caste (*triwangsa*) and commoner (*sudra*) banjar. However, membership in political parties did not always follow one’s caste status and local political parties, including the Bali branch of the PKI, did not necessarily or consistently place caste on their political agendas. In some villages, including Kesiman, where the traditional aristocracy was power-

ful enough to have had privileged access to modern Dutch-sponsored education, it was they who formed the core of the local leftist organizations' memberships. In Kesiman, the principle interests of aristocratic leftists were not in opposing "feudalism", including caste privilege, or in re-ordering systems of land ownership dominated by the royal houses, but in promoting an oftentimes diffuse notion of a universal modernity, including expanding access to modern education, bringing Balinese Hinduism in line with what they saw as the "pure" Hinduism of India (implying, most controversially, the elimination or "rationalization" of certain Hindu-Balinese rituals) and making Bali no longer seem "backward" in the eyes of the world. In other villages – especially those where the left-sponsored land reforms that began in early 1961 threatened to put substantial dents in royal land holdings – it was more often commoners who supported the leftist groups as a means of challenging exploitative land tenure and sharecropping arrangements and the aristocracy who opposed them. And in still other villages, traditional patron-client ties between aristocrats and commoners included shared party affiliations. Likewise, when the violence erupted in Bali in late 1965, it exploited caste conflicts differently according to these local political configurations. In some villages it was mainly those of the Brahmana caste – leftists and non-leftists alike – who were killed, in others the aristocracy (*satria*), and in still others commoners. In other locations, caste seems to have had little to do with the patterns the violence took.

In some cases, it would indeed even be inaccurate to say that killings were motivated by political conflicts, at least in the limited manner in which we normally understand such phenomena. Most of the personal narratives that we have heard claim that while there were indeed many Balinese who were known to be and who identified themselves as communists (or as members of other leftist organizations, including the *Bariisan Tani Indonesia* [Indonesian Peasants' Front], *Gerwani* [Gerakan Wanita Indonesia or Indonesian Women's Movement] or *Partindo* [Partai Indonesia or Indonesia Party]), a great many of those killed went to their deaths denying formal party affiliation. However, after 1965/66, the label "communist" – a label that blotted out all other formations of identity – was attached to victims and, by extension, to their family and friends and even casual acquaintances once they were dead, as an after-the-fact explanation of their fate and its legitimacy. Stories are told of people being killed over land claims, over inheritance, over long-remembered insults or sexual jealousy or, as in Kesiman where many worked as labourers on the Sukarno-sponsored Bali Beach Hotel project, over resentment at not being hired or incidents that occurred at work. But events or emotions other than political party allegiance which might have provoked people to kill were *post facto* subsumed by a grand state-sponsored nar-

rative of party participation, these alternative narratives dismissed as the products of ignorance, sentimentality or subversive inclinations. The creation and, in the years following 1965/66, maintenance of such thinking was a form of symbolic violence with very real material consequences for family members of dead “communists”, who saw their civil rights sharply curtailed. In this context, any real reconciliation would require not only social rapprochement but also a rethinking of the very terms that have been used to describe and explain what happened in 1965/66.

Balinese survivors also describe how, when it became clear that no one with even the loosest of ties to the PKI – such as once having lent one’s truck to a known PKI member or once having attended a PKI-sponsored arts performance – would be spared, many who feared being condemned asked family members to kill them, preferring to die at the hands of someone they trusted would carry out the necessary rituals for the dead, rather than at the hands of the military or paramilitary gangs who “disappeared” alleged communists and dumped their bodies in the ocean or in secret mass graves. Others “turned themselves in” at their local banjar halls, where the ritual offerings that are normally made after death were prepared in advance and where banjar members would join together to kill them. Others committed suicide rather than be tortured or disappeared, or drank poison publicly as a way of “proving” they were not communists. There were also several cases in Kesiman where brothers killed sisters, brothers killed brothers or fathers killed children rather than see them sexually abused or tortured or killed by paramilitary gangs, drawing upon and transforming notions of ritual sacrifice through these acts. In our discussions with victims and killers alike, it has become clear that few people felt at the time that there were clear “sides” to take or free options for action or restraint. As the historian Geoffrey Robinson describes in his account of 1965/66 in Bali, the military made it clear through a concerted propaganda campaign that a refusal to actively participate in the project of “cleansing” communism from the national body politic would be taken as an admission of one’s own guilt.<sup>15</sup> Even if there were few “real communists” in a particular village, there were severe pressures to create some by whatever social and symbolic elaboration necessary. The strain caused by these injunctions was severe, and indeed some of those who were victimized by seeing family members killed then participated in violent acts themselves. In these cases, categories of “perpetrators” and “victims” overlap and blur, rendering reconciliation less a matter of effecting social intercourse between those estranged by violence than with finding ways to come to terms with the challenge to basic notions of society and self that terror engendered.

These particular configurations of violence have helped to create the context in which memory might now be articulated. To the extent that

narrating one's experiences involves positioning oneself as a subject of and in the past, it evokes far more ambivalence for those who can neither imagine themselves as having been unequivocally "victimized" nor "victimizing". The modern juridical language of perpetrators, victims and witnesses, which presumes certain consistent subject positions, or the neo-liberal appeal for truth-telling and national reconciliation, which holds as its premise a transparent notion of historical narrative and as its goal the recovery of national subjects who can be brought together into a shared symbolic community, often falls far short of being able to encompass memory, its articulation and the contemporary politics in which it is embedded. As one Balinese woman survivor of 1965, who lost a husband and a son in the violence, responded to news that "people in Jakarta" were proposing a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission: "Why should I tell them what happened to my family? You know and I know the truth: that nobody knows what really happened." Her concern with the audience of memory, with the uses to which memory might be put, and with the sense that knowledge of the past can be at once shared ("you know and I know the truth") and ineffable ("nobody knows what really happened") requires a model for making sense of multiple pasts that does not limit sense-making to the realm of public narrative.

The end of most of the physical violence by mid-1966<sup>16</sup> signalled not an end to survivors' suffering but the beginning of decades of oppression, as the New Order state elaborated the alleged communist coup attempt into a historical justification for its repressive practices of rule. In the aftermath of the bloodshed, terror settled closely into the space of the family, which became a crucial site for the transmission of fear and the new state ideologies that depended upon it for their maintenance. Not only were families broken apart by deaths and arrests, but also the trauma of these losses was compounded by social sanctions against public mourning for the dead, who were demonized by the New Order state as dangerous criminals who deserved their fate. Especially in those cases where the bodies of victims were never recovered and the cremation rituals that would ensure them a place in the pantheon of divine ancestors were never able to be performed, there remain, to this day, ragged gaps in kinship networks. Normally, Balinese in the Kesiman area are thought to reincarnate back into their extended families, usually within a generation or two of their deaths, and people commonly visit spirit mediums (*balian peluasan*) to determine who has reincarnated in a child. But since 1965, there have been less than a handful of those killed in the violence who have been said to have returned to their families through reincarnation. These painful lingering absences, and the worry that attempts to address them by seeking out victims' remains and holding proper cremations could provoke the state to punch new holes in the social fabric, encour-

aged Balinese survivors to enact state scripts of appropriate citizenship with often-exaggerated deference, leading survivors to bitterly cite Bali's "successes" at implementing a host of New Order campaigns, from family planning to child immunization to "love your village" development projects to casting votes for the ruling Golkar party.

Despite the common use of concepts like "collective memory" to refer to the recollections submerged in post-conflict social life, the Balinese families that emerged from the violence were not homogenous repositories of shared understandings of the past which can now, in the post-conflict era, be tapped for the truths they contain. Gender was among the most crucial differences that shaped survivors' experiences and the limits and possibilities for their enunciation.<sup>17</sup> In families where men had been imprisoned, killed or "disappeared", women were often forced to shoulder the burdens of caring for themselves and their children alone or in cooperation with other widows. While some women were lucky enough to be received back into their natal families after the loss of their husbands, many were shunned out of fear of the dangerous political visibility thought to accompany them. The hundreds of Balinese women who were jailed for alleged communist affiliations also faced, upon their release, frequent refusals by their husbands' families to allow them to reclaim their children, who are considered by Balinese customary law (*adat*) to belong to the patriline. Not only were former women political prisoners thought to be politically dangerous, they were believed, because of their presumed bitterness and emotional instability, to be more likely to engage in black magic and thus doubly menacing, even to their own children. Women's rights as widows to the lands and possessions of husbands killed or abducted were also easily cast aside by using the stamp of "communist".

Violence did not simply "unmake" families, however. Rather, it simultaneously ossified ties that had previously been fluid to form fixed units amenable to state surveillance, and strained emotional bonds by inserting suspicion and silence into everyday family life. Post-1965, fragmented Balinese families were perversely knit back together by the "clean environment" (*bersih lingkungan*) policy of the New Order government, which claimed that spouses, parents, siblings, children and even grandchildren of those marked as communists were "infected" by political "un-cleanliness" and thus to be barred from participation in the government bureaucracy or civil society organizations. Balinese families, newly corporatized by the use of traditionally flexible and contested kinship relations as tools of political identification,<sup>18</sup> became important sites for social surveillance. Older relatives whose memories of the violence were still strong monitored the younger generation for actions or utterances that could be interpreted by the state as "political", thus risking new re-

pressions on the entire family. Just as survivors of the violence describe the military and paramilitaries' intrusions into the enclosed space of the family compound as a traumatic violation of normal tenets of sociality, this new insertion of the state into family practice and subjectivity is identified as one of the most disturbing aspects of New Order rule. "We still spoke to each other", says one woman, remembering her relations with the several dozen family members with whom she shared both a family compound and a designation as politically "unclean", "but we no longer spoke in the same way. We guarded our words, not knowing who was helping the state guard us."

Extended kinship networks often became fraught with tensions, as "clean" segments of families grew resentful of being linked to their "dirty" relatives, and as those who had been terrorized or had experienced the deaths of close family members suspected their more distant relatives of having offered the information that led to their victimization. Families became sites for the education in and preservation of what Veena Das, writing about the experiences of women following the partition of India and Pakistan, has called "poisonous knowledge", the practical understanding that normative notions of social relations are fictions that may fragment under the strain of betrayal and disempowerment.<sup>19</sup> These stresses were sometimes compounded by family members who manipulated their "unclean" relatives' tenuous positions to claim communally held land as their individual possessions. Taking advantage of victims' fears of the government apparatus, they were able to obtain for themselves the land ownership certificates the Indonesian state, at the urging of the World Bank, began in the 1970s to promote in the name of order and development.<sup>20</sup> While a few Balinese succeeded in moving elsewhere on the island, attempting to leave the stigma of the past and the tensions of the present behind, the vast majority remained in their original communities, where they came face to face with those who had terrorized them or those they had terrorized while attending village temple ceremonies, shopping in the market or walking their children to school. Patterns of everyday life, speech and social interaction shifted to accommodate memories of violence and fears of further reprisals, rendering the past constantly present in social interaction.

The violence also created new ways of speaking and of imagining language. Survivors of 1965/66 often describe it as the time when *ulian raos abuku matemahing pati* – when one could die just because of a word. Spoken words are known in Bali to evoke actions, like the holy mantras of priests or the stories of shadow puppeteers that resonate across the visible (*sekala*) and invisible (*niskala*) worlds, temporarily binding and directing energies, channelling the impersonal potency known as *sakti* that imbues the organic and inorganic universe.<sup>21</sup> The word of a curse, spo-

ken by the powerful, can bring illness or even death, and words can invest the inanimate – a mask, a *barong*, a jar of holy water – with *taksu* or charisma. But in 1965/66, words became new kinds of triggers. Improperly articulated words – an insult never quite forgotten, low Balinese spoken to someone who thought they should have been addressed in high Balinese, flirting exchanges with someone else’s wife – could return from the past to provoke horrifically exaggerated responses. One 15-year-old in our village who was said to have “talked too much” for some people’s liking was corralled in a wicker cage used to transport pigs and then thrown into the river to drown. A man who saw his neighbour helping to burn down someone’s house called out in protest and the next day was dead. And one word above all, the word “communist”, held power to determine who lived and died, a power no one word had ever been known to possess before. Uttering the word “communist”, speakers shifted social assumptions: No longer did the powerful alone utter words of power but the word itself, for those who dared to speak it in accusation, was imagined capable of saving one’s own life and determining others’ destinies. Heady, extraordinary, horrific: language became an unstable weapon in terror’s fantastic arsenal, like a mythical *keris* dagger, blade loose in the hilt, that could slip and wound its bearer should the flow of battle turn backwards. For as the word “communist” was wielded, it came to mean far more than one who had pledged to party membership or even felt sympathy with the PKI’s aims. As the ambitions of those who spoke it extended beyond the mandate of uprooting the PKI to staking social claims, exacting revenge or protecting one’s self and family in a treacherously shifting landscape, “communist” transmuted from a symbol of political affiliation in the narrow sense to an indexical sign pointing to the instability of knowledge itself, to the impossibility of accurately reading another’s signs in an opaque field of highly charged power relations. As one man who saw several of his family members killed expressed it: “Today you call me a communist, tomorrow someone calls you a communist. Anyone could be a communist as long as someone was willing to name them as one.”

Not only were words imbued with dangerous new potential, they became disarticulated from the things they had been thought to represent: *sentimen*, an Indonesianized word from Sukarno’s “neo-imperial” West, was popularized in 1965 by army propagandists to refer to local affective ties, with people urged to sever their emotional bonds in order to root out communist evil in their families and villages. A *periksa* or “inspection”,<sup>22</sup> an Indonesian word reeking of state authority, of efficient, top-down bureaucracy, could enter the intimate space of one’s family home, bringing the state and its subjects into a terrifying new embrace, as paramilitary gangs searched for evidence of women’s communist sympathies

in the form of hammer and sickle tattoos on the vagina or abdomen, “inspections” that often ended in rape or forced concubinage. *Jatah*, an Indonesian word meaning an allotment or quota, was understood prior to 1965 to refer to the rations of kerosene, rice and sugar given by the government to supplement civil servants’ wages, or to the share of the rice earned by a banjar’s harvesting society (*sekehe manyi*) that was distributed to each member. But as the killings got underway, a *jatah* became the number of men a paramilitary group aimed to execute in a particular night – a gift of the state to those who served it, the fruit of one’s cooperative labours, became one’s gift to the state’s vision of a new order through violent dismemberment of the social body. Even words like brother or neighbour or friend turned slippery and treacherous, transformed into new hazards like informers, collaborators and provocateurs. And the emotions this speech engendered often grew so strong as to choke off streams of language and to channel meaning into silent forms.

### Articulating memory

Although violence imbued language and social relationships with new ambivalence and uncertainty – ambiguities that continued to fester in the years that followed as state surveillance inserted itself into intimate areas of community and family life – this did not preclude processes of remembering, but rather tended to shift them into indirect registers. One means by which memory has commonly been articulated is in the form of circulating stories, grounded in Balinese Hindu notions of justice, which locate the family as the site of karmic retribution. In our village these include the story of the well-known killer who boasted of hacking his victims apart whose child was later born with stump-like legs and arms. Another tale often told is that of the man, a member of the anti-communist Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, or PNI), who killed one of his two brothers, a member of the PKI, and later killed himself. Ten years after the events, the surviving brother’s wife gave birth to a child who, a psychic informed her, was the reincarnation of the murdered PKI brother. The child, once it became public who he was, was shunned as a “PKI child” within his staunchly nationalist family (although he later grew up to be an activist working to collect data on the killings). There is the story of the nationalist paramilitary leader known to have raped dozens of women accused of having communist ties, and who was later unable to father a child. And there are dozens of other stories of killers who died young, fell ill or suffered various misfortunes of supernatural origin. Such local histories, spread through community networks by rumour and gossip, exist in stark counterpoint to official gov-

ernment narratives, reaching as they do for a realm of justice and historical diagnosis outside the control of the state apparatus. Yet they share the same premise: that the violent past is very much a present matter.

Memory also arises in debates over ritual practice, especially over the role of the body in cremation rites and the role of the state in organizing religious ritual. During 1965/66, the body became a site of terror, both as a target of violent acts and as a locus of unsettling absence. The “disappearing” of those accused of communism not only deprived families of a means of localizing mourning through the performance of death rituals, including communal washing of the body and cremation (*ngaben*) rites, it also led to deep uncertainties about the efficacy of the rituals that were forced to substitute effigies for actual bodies. Beginning in the 1970s, as the state assumed greater control over religious practice in Indonesia, the Parisadha Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI), the official state-regulated organization that claims authority over Hinduism in Indonesia, began to sponsor *nyapuh* – “sweeping” or “cleansing” rituals that were said to act in lieu of cremation for those who remained un-cremated due to neglect, lack of financial resources or, implicitly, because the location of their bodies was unknown to their families.<sup>23</sup> PHDI officials insisted that it was the cremation ritual’s purification of the “soul” (*atma*), not the presence of the material body of the deceased, that made a cremation effective at returning the dead to the realm of the divine ancestors. Yet family members of those killed in 1965/66 often refused to accept this new theological stance, relying on the continuing absence of their disappeared family members as reincarnated in their children to keep memory alive in contradiction of official erasures from national belonging and in opposition to official claims about ritual practice.

Other sites of memory include the return of the dead via supernatural channels to a social influence from which the state attempted to exclude them. Some – although by no means a majority – of the family members of those killed in 1965/66 maintain contact with their lost relatives, communicating through spirit mediums, hearing their whispers (*pawisik*) in dreams or speaking with the voices of those dead considered to have already become deified ancestors in trance (*kerauhan*). Ibu Ari, a woman who lost her husband and brother in the violence, described the first time she was visited by her brother after his death:

We were so close, so very close. So close that when he died that afternoon, when he was killed, who knows where, nobody knew the place, that same night he came looking for me. He called out to me three times. I had already fallen asleep over there, next to that small coconut tree. Already he was looking for me. We were so close. He would tell me everything. If he spoke to our older brother once a day, he would speak to me ten times. He had left his watch behind. The day he died, his first son was just 42 days old, it was the day of his

*dedinan* ceremony. He said to me [about the child], “Later, when he’s grown, don’t forget about him. It doesn’t matter if you have nothing to eat, you must give him the food from your own mouth, for this child who still lives.” He told me to sell the watch to pay for the *dedinan* ceremony. Three times he came to me, coming back and forth, telling me, “Remember, remember, remember”. I was so shocked. I didn’t know that he was dead until the next day, when someone came to tell us he had been killed. They never told us where the place was where he had died, just that he was dead. He told me to remember.

As the years passed and the New Order continued its project of history-making, characterizing those who died in 1965/66 as communists who were willing to destroy family, religion and state in pursuit of their evil aims, Ibu Ari continued to be visited by her brother. Often he would just greet her and then depart, but sometimes he would give her instructions about family ritual matters, which she and her relatives followed without question. These instructions had little to do with the stance he had taken while he was alive in favour of simplifying and “rationalizing” religious ritual – a stance that was later glossed by the state as communist “atheism” – but instead directed Ibu Ari to make additions to the offerings she was preparing to make them more “complete”. That her brother, who had exhibited little interest while he was alive in the women’s work of offering-making, was now instructing her in ritual procedure was not odd to Ibu Ari; she was aware that once a spirit entered the realms of the dead he or she could change in character. Indeed in the early 1970s, when Ibu Ari was among a group of women visiting a psychic to inquire as to who had reincarnated in a child of the family, it was she who was addressed by the psychic with the voice of her uncle, a PKI member who before his death in 1965 had caused controversy in the family by arguing that his own father should be cremated simply. This uncle, Ibu Ari said, told her that he had changed, that he was now a woman, and exhorted her, like her brother had, to “remember”.

Memories too painful or politically dangerous to be uttered may also take root in forms that avoid spoken language altogether. One such case was that of Gung Ngurah, whose family compound had been attacked and set on fire by paramilitaries from a neighbouring banjar, who later killed four of his relatives, including his father. Gung Ngurah’s family, although of high caste, had not been wealthy, and had owned little of value except a modern-style cabinet in which his father had stored books. This cabinet, hacked and scarred by the blades of the paramilitaries, who had emptied it and burned its contents, remained in Gung Ngurah’s front parlour, where any guest of the family could see it, for over 35 years after the violence, long after Gung Ngurah had become a relatively successful businessman able to afford the furnishings more typical of modern, middle-class Balinese. The battered cabinet was not only strikingly out

of place in a room full of chrome, glass and plastic, it sat awkwardly at odds with Gung Ngurah's absolute refusal to say anything about 1965/66, even when other family members brought it up tentatively in conversation. The cabinet, positioned not in the private interior of the house but in the space open to social interaction, was certainly a statement of memory, a political statement not without its own dangers, but one that did not rely on words for its meaning. With this material icon, Gung Ngurah displayed the traces of an alternative history.

Yet it is important to recognize that memory, despite its power to avoid conscription into official histories that replace the subjectivities of survivors with caricatures of political agency, is far from always liberatory. Pak Nyoman, a member of the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), or Indonesian Peasants' Front, who made his living farming corn and sweet potatoes on a small plot of family dry land, managed to escape from the nationalist paramilitary group that had rounded up other BTI members in his village for execution by the military. Hiding behind a stand of trees in the dark, Pak Nyoman watched as his fellow villagers were forced to dig four holes in his sweet potato field, each twenty-five meters long, five meters wide and two meters deep. He watched as over 200 of his BTI compatriots were herded at rifle point, arms tied behind their backs, toward the edge of the trenches. He heard the cracks of the soldiers' rifles and saw the bodies fall into the pits, and then he could witness no more. Pak Nyoman managed to escape to another part of the island, where he found work as a houseboy for an anti-communist family who did not know his history. But several years later he was fired after his employer discovered him reading a newspaper and, suspicious that a poor farmer should be literate, investigated his past and found out he had political ties. Pak Nyoman felt he had no choice but to return to his village and resume his occupation as a farmer on his family lands. He planted sweet potatoes as he had before, and his father had before him. To stop planting the field, he explained, would have been to acknowledge that he knew what had happened there, and to acknowledge his memories would have been to threaten the tenuous peace in his village that allowed him to live. And so he planted, precisely because he remembered. But when the sweet potatoes, fertilized by death, that his hoe uncovered were unnaturally large, some the size of human heads, he sent them by truck to a faraway market, where those who would consume them had no claim on his memories.

## Speaking from the shadows

"I'm so sorry," I say to Gung Aji, who has spent the morning showing us where the bones of his brother lie under what it now a plaza of modern shops selling

T-shirts, cellular phones and beauty supplies. "I didn't mean to cause you pain by asking you to remember such terrible experiences." Gung Aji smiles. "Ah, it's not you who has made me remember. I will have these memories until I'm also dead. No, you don't need to feel sorry. It is these memories that make me know I'm still alive."<sup>24</sup>

To understand processes of remembering 1965/66 in Bali, it is important, we have argued, to attend to the multiple ways in which memory may be situated, hidden or expressed in engagement with everyday life and in contradiction to official historical narratives. This is not, however, to suggest that there has been a shared "collective memory" preserved by Balinese survivors of the violence in defiance of state attempts at erasure or commemoration, nor to conclude that "history" and "memory" can be simply opposed. The "collectivities" shaped out of violence – collectivities that were often exaggerations of Balinese social forms encouraged by state surveillance and the "clean environment" policy – were beset by lingering tension and suspicion, saturated with a sense of the ineffability of experience and the inadequacy of language, grown alien and treacherous, to act as a means of free and transparent social communication. Likewise, memory has not been preserved in some sterile space, uncontaminated by the power-saturated discourses that emerged in the aftermath of violence. Yet to recognize the differences through which memory is filtered and out of which it arises – including differences of gender, social location, caste, class or political position – is to refuse to reproduce the master symbol of "Communism" that has terrorized Balinese for so long.

In the political and cultural milieu of Bali in the years following 1965/66, a context that has been distinctly unsympathetic to memory, neither speaking nor keeping silent is an entirely comfortable position to occupy. Memory, in this context, often refuses appropriation into familiar genres of "truth-telling" or realist historical narrative that describe an original trauma long since past. Rather, it is an unavoidable aspect of everyday engagement with the world. Few Balinese can avoid encountering traces of 1965/66 in their families and their communities; these sites of ambivalent memory – knife scars, sweet potatoes, spirit mediums, birth divinations, death rituals, chance encounters in the market or the street – all become unruly ghosts of violence, scars on a social body that may scab but rarely heal, for to close off the wounds would be to foreclose the possibility of memory, and to stop remembering would mean to stop participating in the world that has made survival possible.

Indeed, one of the most challenging lessons we have learned from our work in Bali is that to engage with the place of memory in the aftermath of violence is never a simple matter, whether ethically, politically or theoretically. There is no stable analytic ground from which one might de-

wise universally applicable programs for addressing memory's place in violence. Rather, violence itself shades and shapes memory, the languages in which it might be articulated, and the social spaces in which it becomes meaningful, in complex local ways.

We would suggest, however, that the case of Bali does offer some important general lessons for the practice of peace-building. Memory, as we have stressed, is never simply liberatory, existing in resistant opposition to official history. Rather, history and memory interpenetrate, as discourses that speak not merely to a long-ago past but to broader relations of power in the present. Thus projects to promote peace should not assume that the creation of social or political spaces or mechanisms for the articulation of local memory would necessarily undermine oppression or recuperate the voices of victims. While silence is arguably an untenable ethical position, in Bali, to engage with memories of 1965/66 is not only to expose the terrible history of a state's violence against its own people and the West's complicity in erasing it, but to enter an often more painful domain where families and communities remain fractured by memories of suspicion, betrayal and the intimate reproduction of state power. Likewise, while many Balinese cite a strong desire to speak of the past, expressions of memory cannot always be counted on to pave a linear path to individual or social healing. Remembering is rarely simply therapeutic or painful, but is frequently far more ambiguous and ambivalent in its emotive power and social effects. Programs to address the aftermath of conflict must recognize such complexities, grounding their work, as much as possible, in ethnographically informed awareness of not only local histories but also contemporary conflicts. Thus truth commissions, fact-finding projects, national or community forums or other programs for making memories of atrocity and betrayal public cannot be assumed to constitute a final stage of psychosocial repair, but must be followed by attention to the social and political tensions such endeavours may expose or let loose.

A linked lesson has to do with the role of "culture" in peace-building. All too often, transitional justice programs work with general templates that are then "translated" into local contexts in the name of "cultural sensitivity". An understanding of local contexts is undeniably crucial; in the Bali case, it helps to explain why Balinese have expressed much more enthusiasm about, for instance, ritual means of articulating memory or the reformatting of ritual networks broken by violence than they have about the prospects for a formal truth commission. An openness to the diverse forms remembering might take is thus key to planning appropriate and effective projects. However, as we – along with the other contributors to this volume – have cautioned, it is equally important not to romanticize or essentialize culture. In the Balinese case, as in so many

others, struggles over who gets to define “culture” were among those that provoked conflict, and determined whose memories were heard in its aftermath. Peace-building projects need to be wary of resorting to “culture” or “traditional means of conflict resolution” as uncritical categories of experience or analysis, instead making room for the diverse, and politically complex, interpretations of the meaning and import of culture in the wake of mass crimes.

## Notes

1. This chapter is a revised version of a paper first prepared by Leslie Dwyer for the International Symposium on Anthropology in Indonesia, Udayana University, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, July 2002. It is based on over four years of ongoing collaborative field research in Bali, funded by a MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing Fellowship and grants from the H. F. Guggenheim Foundation, the Haverford College Faculty Research Fund and the United States Institute of Peace. Material from this article was presented at the UCLA Center for Southeast Asian Studies and at Harvard University; we thank audiences at both institutions for valuable feedback. For comments on versions of this article, we thank Mary Zurbuchen, Hildred Geertz, Henk Schulte-Nordholt, Byron Good, Mary-Jo DeVecchio Good and John MacDougall. This article is dedicated to the memory of Gung Nini Raka, one of hundreds of thousands of Balinese survivors whose stories have yet to be told.
2. The exact number of Indonesians killed is unknown and will likely remain so, despite recent efforts at “fact-finding” by Indonesian victims’ advocacy groups such as the Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembantaian (Foundation for Research on the Victims of Massacre). Estimates have ranged from around 300,000 deaths to as many as three million, with a figure of one million frequently cited in academic and journalistic accounts of the violence. The politics of numbering the dead is, of course, far from straightforward, speaking both to the state’s desire to block access to non-official historical research and to activists’ desires to ground calls for attention to the violence in statistical claims of its significance. It is important to note, however, that while the extent of the suffering wrought by the violence of 1965/66 should be undeniable, survivors often locate its import not in its scope but its intimacy, not in its manageable facticity but in its destabilizing incomprehensibility, not in its right to a place in the annals of the twentieth century’s greatest tragedies but in its continuing power to inflict possibilities for living in the present. Gyanendra Pandey discusses a comparable politics of enumerating the deaths that occurred during the partition of British India in 1947, suggesting that such “extravagant, expandable, unverifiable but credible” (p. 91) statistics function to obscure the social production of history and its qualities of rumour. See Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
3. Geoffrey Robinson’s historical account *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, based on research carried out while Suharto was still in power, gives an estimate of 80,000 deaths in Bali. Activists conducting fact-finding projects after Suharto stepped down from power have estimated the figure to be closer to 100,000.
4. See Agung Putri, “Evading the truth: Will a Truth and Reconciliation Commission ever be formed?” *Inside Indonesia* 73, January–March 2003, available at <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit73/putri%20%truth%commission.htm>; Mary S. Zurbuchen,

- “Looking back to move forward: A truth commission could bring healing for a tragic past”, *Inside Indonesia* 65, January–March 2001, available at <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit65/mary.htm>.
5. Our work as anthropologists has drawn upon a range of participant-observation methodologies. Santikarma was born and raised in Kesiman, and together we have conducted fieldwork focused on 1965/66 during a total of four years of residence between 1999 and 2005. In addition to carrying out semi-structured interviews with survivors of the violence, their children and their grandchildren, we have paid close attention to how the violence has been portrayed in national and local public culture, including official speeches, media reports and school curricula, and how memories have emerged, transformed and recombined in everyday social life, especially in local political negotiations and ritual practice. The ability to place the voices of one’s interlocutors in a broader social and cultural field of meaning, power and context is, we would suggest, of crucial importance for those working in post-conflict settings marked by barriers and disincentives to speaking openly about the past. Anthropologists, historians and human rights activists are often faced with the challenge of working with methodologies that are better suited to discovering what people are willing to remember than how, what and why they forget. This makes it crucial, we suggest, to consider how a reliance on formal contexts of fact-finding and truth-telling may miss important aspects of the social life of memory, as well as to give deep consideration to the ethical and political implications of one’s work (see chapter 1).
  6. Paul Farmer, *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
  7. For an overview of recent work on 1965/66 conducted by Indonesian academics and activists, see Mary Zurbuchen, “History, Memory and the ‘1965 Incident’ in Indonesia”, *Asian Survey* 42, no. 4, 2002, pp. 561–581.
  8. For discussion of the Wonosobo incident, see Zurbuchen, “History, Memory and the ‘1965 Incident’” and Femi Adi, n.d., “Corat-corek Tentang Perkuburan Massal di Hutan dekat Wonosobo” (Notes on the Mass Grave in the Forest near Wonosobo) on the Web site of the Foundation for Research on the Victims of Massacre (YPKP), <http://www.wirantaprawira.de/ypkp/news.htm>. In May 2000, the late Ibu Sulami, a former vice secretary of the leftist Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerwani) and one of the founders of the YPKP, was threatened by members of a group calling itself the “Anti-Communist Command”. In September 2000, her house, which served as an office for the YPKP, was burned down (see <http://www.wirantaprawira.de/ypkp/sulami.htm>).
  9. On Nahdlatul Ulama’s role in 1965/66, see Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
  10. We recognize, of course, that psychological approaches to engaging with the aftermath of mass crimes vary widely, ranging from traditional individual therapy based on biomedical or Western psychiatric models, to community-based or “culturally sensitive” models, including those that reposition the therapeutic process within discourses of witnessing and working against human rights abuses. We would caution against the inscription of oversimplistic dichotomies between Western “individualism” and non-Western “community”, or between biomedicine/psychiatry and local healing, with the latter seen as the only appropriate response to suffering. We have, however, been concerned about the ways in which the Indonesian state’s attempts to suppress memories of 1965/66 that contradict official narratives have resonated closely with a “pop psychology” prevalent in Indonesian public culture and sometimes present in international humanitarian work that locates memory as a problematic barrier to individual and national “recovery”. For example, in the aftermath of the 2002 terrorists bombings of a crowded Bali nightclub, a US-based international aid organization sponsored the placement of a series of public

- service newspaper announcements encouraging Balinese to seek treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, using a headline reading “Ingin Melupakan?” or “Do You Want to Forget?” Those still suffering from the effects of the 1965/66 violence were not included in this program. For a more detailed discussion of the politics of framing suffering in the language of “trauma” or “post-traumatic stress disorder” in Bali, see Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, “Post-Traumatic Politics: Violence, Memory and Biomedical Discourse in Bali”, in R. Lemelson and L. Kirmayer, eds, *Trauma, Culture and the Brain*, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
11. Honna details how Indonesian military ideology framed and reframed the notion of “communism” from 1966 to 1998 to address changing “threats” to its power, ranging from pro-democracy activism to globalization in Jun Honna, “Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressures During the Late Soeharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts”, in B. Anderson, ed., *Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001. Heryanto discusses the deployment of and resistances to the term “communist” during the New Order in Ariel Heryanto, “Where Communism Never Dies: Violence, Trauma and Narration in the Last Cold War Capitalist Authoritarian State”, *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 2, no. 2, 1999, pp. 147–177.
  12. For a discussion of how tourism and state developmentalism have shaped discourses of “Balinese culture”, see Degung Santikarma, “The Power of ‘Balinese Culture’”, in U. Ramsayer, ed., *Bali: Living in Two Worlds*, Basel: Museum der Kulturen and Verlag Schwabe, 2001.
  13. Much of the work of the Bali branch of the national Foundation for Research on the Victims of Massacre (YPKP) (a very small, poorly funded organization compared to its Java-based colleagues) has consisted of trying to identify mass graves from 1965/66. Hopes for exhuming the bodies they contain, as was done in Wonosobo, Java, have been slim, however. Such land is considered by Balinese to be *tenget* – spiritually “hot” or “contaminated”, and thus unfit for Balinese to inhabit or cultivate. Much of this land was therefore sold to non-Balinese or, in South Bali, used to build tourism facilities, meaning that any attempt to find what lies beneath the ground would most likely face serious opposition from the owners of what now lies above the ground. As one activist reminded us: “Tourism is big business, big money. If you take on tourism, the next thing you know you’re a communist, and the corrupt *aparats* [“security apparatus”, military and police] make sure that you’re buried as well.”
  14. Good and DelVecchio Good discuss the colonial history of *amuk*, described as a culture-bound syndrome unique to Malays, and how the term was later used by the New Order government to characterize political protest as pathology in Byron Good and Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, “‘Why Do the Masses So Easily Run Amuk?’ Madness and Violence in Indonesian Politics”, *Latitudes*, no. 5 (June 2001), p. 12.
  15. See Geoffrey Robinson, *The Dark Side of Paradise*.
  16. In Kesiman, there have continued to be sporadic incidences of violence that residents attribute to the tensions that remain in the wake of 1965/66.
  17. For discussion of the gender politics of 1965/66, see Leslie Dwyer, “The Intimacy of Terror: Gender and the Violence of 1965–66 in Bali”, *Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context* 10, 2004, available at <http://www.she.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue10/dwyer.html>; Saskia Wieringa, *Sexual Politics in Indonesia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Other works that address women’s experiences of 1965/66 through testimonial genres include Annie Pohlman, “A Fragment of a Story: Gerwani and Tapol Experiences”, *Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context* 10, 2004, available at <http://www.she.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue10/pohlman.html>; Carmel Budiarto, *Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag: A Western Woman Tells*

- Her Story*, London: Cassell Academic, 2000; and Ibu Marni, "I am a leaf in a storm: A woman's political autobiography," *Inside Indonesia* 26, March 1991. Important Indonesian-language discussions of the gender dimensions of 1965/66 include Budiawan, "Merintis gerakan rekonsiliasi akar rumput berperspektif jender", *Kompas*, 1 March 2004; Ruth Indiah Rahayu, "Dampak peristiwa 1965: Hancurnya perempuan kita!" *Sekitar.com* Internet journal, 2004; Sulami, *Perempuan, Kebenaran dan Penjara*, Jakarta: Cipta Lestari, 1999; Sulami, *Merentang Perempuan*, Jakarta: Cipta Lestari, 2001; and sections of John Roosa, Ayu Ratih and Hilmar Farid, eds, *Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65, Esai-Esai Sejarah Lisan*, Jakarta: ELSAM, 2004.
18. Hildred and Clifford Geertz's classic work *Kinship in Bali*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, notes the contested, flexible nature of traditional Balinese kinship relations.
  19. See Veena Das, "The Act of Witnessing: Violence, Poisonous Knowledge, and Subjectivity," in V. Das, A. Kleinman, M. Ramphele and P. Reynolds, eds, *Violence and Subjectivity*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
  20. The politics of land tenure and use in Bali and their relationship to the violence of 1965/66 and the contested figure of "communism" are far too complex to be addressed here. For more detailed discussion of the politics of land in Bali, see Anton Lucas and Carol Warren, "The state, the people, and their mediators: The struggle over agrarian law reform in post-New Order Indonesia", *Indonesia* 76, 2003, pp. 87–126; Mary Zurbuchen and Degung Santikarma, "Bali after the bombing: Land, livelihoods, and legacies of violence", paper presented at the Yale University Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series, February 2004; and Graeme MacRae, "The value of land in Bali: Land tenure, land reform and commodification", in Thomas A. Reuter, ed., *Inequality, Crisis and Social Change in Indonesia: The Muted Worlds of Bali*, London: Routledge Curzon, 2002.
  21. For discussion of Balinese concepts of *sakti* see Hildred Geertz, *Images of Power: Balinese Paintings Made for Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994.
  22. Indonesia scholars reading our work have pointed out that the Indonesian noun for inspection should be *pemeriksaan*, not *periksa*. This is true; however, Balinese do not always speak Indonesian as they "should". Grammatically proper or not, Balinese identify *periksa* – both the word and the events – as emanating from the central Indonesian state.
  23. These *nyapuh* were especially widespread before large-scale state-sponsored ceremonies, such as the Eka Dasa Rudra of 1979. The ritual claims and counter-claims made during the New Order by various factions within and without the PHDI over the issue of cremation are complex indeed and cannot be fully addressed here. The *nyapuh* were, as many survivors of 1965 recognized, part of an Indonesia-wide campaign of depoliticization of village life that sought to remove potential sites of local contestation by placing them under state control. For more analysis of discourses of cremation, Hindu "identity" and modernist reform, see Linda Connor, "Contesting and Transforming the Work for the Dead in Bali: The Case of *Ngaben Ngirit*", in *Being Modern in Bali: Image and Change*, New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monographs no. 43, 1996.
  24. Field notes from a discussion between Leslie Dwyer and a Balinese survivor of violence, August 2004.